IT Infrastructure

PEAP-MSCHAPv2 Wi-Fi and VPN Stopped Signing In? The Windows NTLMv1 Change and How to Fix It

A flat vector illustration of a brass signet stamp standing upright beside a row of round pressed wax seals in deep red on a plain cream card, one older seal in the row cracked and crumbling while the fresh seals are crisp, a visual for moving PEAP-MSCHAPv2 Wi-Fi and VPN sign-in to certificate-based authentication

Did office Wi-Fi or VPN that uses PEAP-MSCHAPv2 stop signing people in after the October 2026 Windows update? A planned security change is the likely cause. Starting with the October 13, 2026 security update, Windows blocks single sign-on that relies on NTLMv1-derived credentials by default. Wi-Fi, wired and VPN connections that use MS-CHAPv2 depend on exactly that.

Many small IT teams and MSPs are seeing this ticket now. Laptops that joined the office network for years suddenly ask for a password, or fail at the sign-in screen. This guide covers what changed, who is affected, how to confirm it, and the fixes by effort. Facts are as of November 2026. The November 10 updates also started a separate NTLM change, signing by default, which we cover with the related Outlook flaw in Outlook zero-day leaks NTLM hashes.

The short version: Microsoft says this is a planned change, not a known issue. Typing credentials by hand still works. A registry setting can turn the old behavior back on for now, but Microsoft calls it a temporary exception. The lasting fix is to move Wi-Fi and VPN from PEAP-MSCHAPv2 to certificate-based authentication, either EAP-TLS or PEAP-TLS.

What changed in the October 2026 update

Microsoft’s support article KB5066470, "Manage NTLMv1 changes and prevent network authentication issues in Windows", describes the change. It covers Windows 11 versions 24H2, 25H2, 26H1 and 26H2, plus Windows Server 2025.

The change is controlled by a registry value named BlockNtlmv1SSO. It has two modes.

  • Audit (0): NTLMv1-based single sign-on is allowed, and Windows logs a warning.
  • Enforce (1): those requests are blocked, and Windows logs an error.

Per the KB, the October 2026 update makes Enforce the default when the value is not set. The update does not create or change the registry value itself. So a machine with no value now behaves as if it were set to 1.

Microsoft flagged this ahead of time. The KB says audit logging started on Windows 11 24H2 and newer in 2025. The Server 2025 rollout began in November 2025. On October 14, 2026, the Windows message center posted a "Take action" notice. It says the change "is not a known issue with the October 2026 security update." Microsoft raised it again in its November 3 "Windows news you can use" roundup.

Why PEAP-MSCHAPv2 breaks

PEAP-MSCHAPv2 is the common username-and-password method for WPA2-Enterprise Wi-Fi and 802.1X wired networks. Windows can sign users in with it automatically, using their Windows logon. That automatic step is the single sign-on (SSO) the change blocks.

Microsoft’s Credential Guard guidance explains the reason. It says Wi-Fi and VPN endpoints based on MS-CHAPv2 "are subject to similar attacks as for NTLMv1." The password-based secret in MS-CHAPv2 is weak in the same way.

The KB lists what might be affected: Wi-Fi, Ethernet and VPN authentication that uses MS-CHAPv2, including PEAP-MSCHAPv2 and EAP-MSCHAPv2. It also says: "Manually entering credentials will continue to work in Enforce mode." Only the automatic sign-in stops.

Which setups are affected by the PEAP-MSCHAPv2 change

Your devices are likely affected if all three of these are true.

  • They run Windows 11 24H2 or later, or Windows Server 2025, with the October 2026 update.
  • Credential Guard is turned off. The KB says the change applies only there, and only if the value is not set.
  • They connect to Wi-Fi, wired 802.1X or VPN with PEAP-MSCHAPv2 or EAP-MSCHAPv2, using the Windows logon automatically.

The usual server side is a RADIUS server checking passwords against Active Directory. In a Windows shop that is often Network Policy Server (NPS). Older Wi-Fi controllers and firewalls with built-in RADIUS can be set up the same way.

What about devices with Credential Guard? They are not newly affected, because Credential Guard already blocks this. Microsoft’s Credential Guard page says that with it running, NTLMv1 single sign-on no longer works. Its list of blocked single sign-on also includes MS-CHAP. So turning on Credential Guard is a good security step, but it will not bring PEAP-MSCHAPv2 single sign-on back.

Symptoms your help desk will see

These are the patterns we would expect from Microsoft’s description.

  • A laptop that used to join office Wi-Fi on its own now prompts for a username and password.
  • Wi-Fi set to connect before sign-in fails at the Windows sign-in screen. A new user then cannot log on with domain credentials.
  • A VPN profile that used the Windows logon now asks for credentials or fails.
  • Typing the same username and password by hand works.

That last point is the quickest test. If manual entry works and automatic sign-in does not, this change is the likely cause.

How to confirm it with event IDs 4024 and 4025

The KB names two events in the Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational log. In Event Viewer, open Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > NTLM > Operational.

Event ID Type What it means
4024 Warning Audit mode. An attempt to use NTLMv1-derived credentials for single sign-on was allowed and logged.
4025 Error Enforce mode. The attempt was blocked by policy.

To check one machine, run this in PowerShell.

Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational" | Where-Object { $_.Id -in 4024, 4025 }

Did you see 4024 warnings before October? Those devices were warning you. If you see 4025 errors now, they are being blocked. Collect these events centrally if you can, so you know how many devices and which networks are involved.

The temporary registry setting

If people cannot work, you can put affected devices back in Audit mode. The KB gives the location.

  • Path: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0
  • Value: BlockNtlmv1SSO, type REG_DWORD
  • Data: 0 for Audit (allow and log), 1 for Enforce (block)

The KB says no restart is needed. You can set it with Group Policy Preferences, Intune or a script, scoped to the devices that need it.

Treat this as a stopgap. Microsoft says it "should only be considered as a scoped, temporary security exception." Write down which devices have it. Set a date to remove it.

Fixes for PEAP-MSCHAPv2 Wi-Fi and VPN, by effort

Microsoft’s direction is the same in every document. The message center notice tells organizations to remove dependencies on MS-CHAPv2. It says to move Wi-Fi and VPN to certificate-based authentication. The Credential Guard page adds that Credential Guard does not block certificate-based sign-in.

Option What it does Effort Lasting fix?
Type credentials by hand Users enter username and password when prompted None for IT; friction for users No
Registry Audit mode (0) Restores single sign-on on chosen devices Low No, Microsoft calls it temporary
EAP-TLS on NPS with your own CA Devices or users sign in with a certificate Medium to high: PKI, auto-enrollment, new network policy Yes
Intune and Microsoft Cloud PKI Cloud-issued certificates for managed devices, used with your RADIUS Medium, plus a paid subscription Yes

Moving PEAP-MSCHAPv2 networks to EAP-TLS or PEAP-TLS

Microsoft’s EAP reference for Windows says certificate-based EAP methods "generally offer the highest level of security" of the options. EAP-TLS uses certificates on both sides. PEAP-TLS wraps the same EAP-TLS exchange inside a PEAP tunnel.

Pick one. Microsoft warns against running both at once. EAP-TLS is the simpler choice for a new setup. PEAP-TLS can make sense if your network gear and policies are already built around PEAP.

Here is what you need.

  • A RADIUS server certificate with the Server Authentication purpose, from a CA your devices trust.
  • A certificate on each device or user with the Client Authentication purpose. On domain-joined PCs this usually comes from Active Directory Certificate Services with auto-enrollment.
  • An updated network policy on NPS (or your RADIUS server) that accepts certificates instead of passwords.
  • Wi-Fi and VPN profiles from Group Policy or Intune. They select the certificate method and check the server certificate.

Keep server validation on. Microsoft’s EAP page says turning it off brings "severe security risks," such as joining a rogue network.

Most organizations issue these certificates from their own private CA rather than a public one. Our post on dual-use certificates explains why public CAs are moving away from client authentication.

Cloud certificates with Intune

Your devices may be managed in Intune, with no CA server to run. For that case, Microsoft offers Microsoft Cloud PKI. Microsoft says it issues, renews and revokes certificates for Intune-managed devices without on-premises servers. It requires a subscription on top of Intune Plan 1 or Plan 2.

Cloud PKI issues the certificates. Microsoft’s page does not mention a RADIUS server, so you still need one that trusts those certificates. That can be NPS or the RADIUS built into your Wi-Fi or firewall platform. It can also be a hosted RADIUS service from a third party. Check that your choice supports EAP-TLS and can check certificate revocation.

A plan for small IT teams

  1. Measure. Pull 4024 and 4025 events to see which devices and networks are affected.
  2. Unblock people. Use manual sign-in where it is tolerable. Use the registry exception only on devices that cannot work otherwise, and log them.
  3. Pick the target. EAP-TLS with your own CA if you run Active Directory and NPS. Intune with Cloud PKI if your devices are cloud-managed.
  4. Pilot. Set up a test SSID or VPN profile with certificates and move a small group first.
  5. Cut over and clean up. Move everyone, turn off the PEAP-MSCHAPv2 policy, and remove the registry exceptions.

If you look after an MSP fleet, the same steps apply per client. Start with clients whose 4025 count is highest. Other Windows work is due this season too. See our posts on Windows 11 23H2 end of servicing and Windows LAPS setup. For remote staff, our VPN explainer covers the basics.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is this a bug in the October 2026 Windows update?

No. Microsoft’s message center says “It is not a known issue with the October 2026 security update.” It is a planned change to block single sign-on that uses NTLMv1-derived credentials.

Which Windows versions are affected?

KB5066470 lists Windows 11 versions 24H2, 25H2, 26H1 and 26H2, and Windows Server 2025. It applies only on devices where Credential Guard is turned off.

Can users still connect to PEAP-MSCHAPv2 Wi-Fi?

Yes, by typing their credentials. The KB says manual entry continues to work in Enforce mode. Only automatic single sign-on is blocked.

Will turning on Credential Guard fix it?

No. Credential Guard also blocks single sign-on for NTLMv1 and MS-CHAP. It is a good security step, but it does not restore PEAP-MSCHAPv2 single sign-on.

How do I turn the old behavior back on?

Set BlockNtlmv1SSO to 0 under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0. Microsoft calls this a scoped, temporary security exception. No restart is needed.

What do event IDs 4024 and 4025 mean?

Both appear in the Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational log. 4024 is a warning that an NTLMv1-derived single sign-on was allowed in Audit mode. 4025 is an error that it was blocked.

Should I use EAP-TLS or PEAP-TLS?

Either is certificate-based and works with Credential Guard. Microsoft says not to deploy both. EAP-TLS is usually the simpler choice for a new setup.

Do I need a CA server to move off PEAP-MSCHAPv2?

Not always. Active Directory Certificate Services is the usual route for domain-joined PCs. Intune-managed devices can use Microsoft Cloud PKI instead, which is a paid add-on.

Does Microsoft Cloud PKI include a RADIUS server?

Microsoft’s Cloud PKI page does not mention one. Plan for NPS, your Wi-Fi or firewall platform’s RADIUS, or a hosted RADIUS service that accepts the certificates.

Digital Matters

IT Infrastructure Desk