An Outlook zero-day fixed in Microsoft’s November 10, 2026 updates is being used in attacks. The flaw, CVE-2026-124194, can make Outlook send a user’s NTLMv2 password hash to a server the attacker controls. Microsoft’s Security Update Guide marks it "Exploitation Detected."
CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 10, with a due date of November 24 for federal agencies. The same Patch Tuesday also started a change to how Windows handles NTLM sign-ins. That change will break some old devices in May 2027 if you do nothing. Facts here are as of November 15, 2026.
The short version: update Outlook and Windows now. Block outbound SMB at your firewall if you have not already. Then start auditing NTLM signing on your Windows servers, so old copiers, NAS units and apps do not fail when Microsoft turns on enforcement in May 2027.
What the Outlook zero-day does
Microsoft calls CVE-2026-124194 an "Outlook Spoofing Vulnerability." It rates it Moderate, with a CVSS score of 6.5. Do not let the rating slow you down. This Outlook zero-day is already in use by attackers.
Here is how it works, per Microsoft’s FAQ. An attacker "could send a specially crafted message file and convince a user to open it in an affected version of Microsoft Outlook." Opening the file can make Outlook connect to an attacker’s server "without displaying the usual external-content warning."
That connection gives away a secret. Microsoft says the flaw "discloses a user’s NTLMv2 hash to the attacker who could use this to authenticate as the user." NTLM is an older Windows sign-in method. Its hash is a scrambled form of the password. With it, an attacker can try to crack the password offline or relay the sign-in to another server.
Two details matter for small teams:
- The user has to open the file. Microsoft says the Preview Pane "is not an attack vector." Someone has to open the malicious file.
- No sign-in is needed to send it. Microsoft describes the attacker as unauthenticated. Anyone who can email your staff can try it.
Microsoft credits two researchers: Benoît Sevens, "using Claude with Anthropic," and a researcher listed as nono. Microsoft has not said who is behind the attacks.
Which Outlook versions need the fix
Microsoft’s product list for CVE-2026-124194, as shown in the NIST National Vulnerability Database entry, names three Office products.
| Product | Fixed in | What to do |
|---|---|---|
| Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise | November 2026 Office security release | Let Click-to-Run update, then confirm the build |
| Office LTSC 2021 | 16.0.14334.21048 | Update and check the version under File, Office Account |
| Office LTSC 2024 | 16.0.17932.21140 | Update and check the version under File, Office Account |
For Microsoft 365 Apps, Microsoft points to its Office security release notes for exact builds by channel. Devices on a slow update channel may not have the fix yet. Check a few machines by hand.
Older Office versions that are out of support do not get fixes like this one. If you still have any, our post on Office 2021 end of support covers your options.
Why CISA’s Outlook zero-day deadline matters to you
CISA’s catalog lists the flaw as "Microsoft Office Outlook Missing User Interaction for Potentially Unsafe Action Vulnerability." The CISA alert added six flaws that day. Two were Barracuda Email Security Gateway flaws, which we covered in Barracuda ESG flaws are being exploited.
The November 24 deadline binds only federal civilian agencies. But CISA says it "encourages all organizations" to prioritize KEV flaws. Treat the date as a good target for your own patching. Nonprofits and associations get the same phishing emails federal staff do.
The release was large. The Hacker News counts 1,259 fixes from Microsoft this month. Of all of them, the Outlook zero-day is the one to do first, because attackers are already using it.
What to do this week about the Outlook zero-day
Start with these steps, in order.
- Patch Outlook. Update Microsoft 365 Apps and any Office LTSC installs. Confirm builds on a sample of machines, including laptops that rarely connect to the office network.
- Patch Windows. The same day’s Windows updates carry the NTLM signing change below. Windows 11 23H2 Enterprise and Education got their last update on November 10, as we covered in Windows 11 23H2 end of servicing.
- Block outbound SMB. Microsoft’s guide to securing SMB traffic says to "block TCP port 445 outbound to the internet at your corporate firewall." That stops many hash leaks to outside servers. Remote staff on home networks are not covered by the office firewall, so patching still comes first.
Two more steps cut the damage if a hash does leak.
- Protect admin accounts. Microsoft’s page on the Protected Users group says members cannot "authenticate with NTLM authentication." Test before adding admins. Microsoft warns to never add service or computer accounts.
- Warn staff. Tell people not to open unexpected attachments, even from known senders. Our phishing attacks explainer covers what to look for.
How the Outlook zero-day and NTLM signing connect
The two fixes target the same weak spot. The Outlook zero-day hands an attacker an NTLMv2 hash. One common next step is a relay attack, where the attacker passes that sign-in on to another server and acts as the user there. Microsoft says in KB5135557 that signing reduces "exposure to relay attacks."
That is why the Phase 2 work matters even after you patch Outlook. Patching closes this one leak. Other leaks will come, in Outlook or elsewhere. Signing that servers require makes a stolen NTLM sign-in much less useful on your network.
For small IT teams the order is simple. Patch the Outlook zero-day this week. Start the signing audit this month. Plan device fixes over the winter, well before May 2027.
NTLM signing is now on by default: Phase 1
The same November 10 updates began a two-step change. Microsoft’s support article KB5135557 explains it. The change addresses CVE-2026-118737, a Critical remote code execution flaw in Windows Remote Procedure Call Runtime. Microsoft rates that one "Exploitation Less Likely."
Signing adds a cryptographic check to each NTLM session. It makes relay attacks much harder. Microsoft says the goal is that NTLM sessions "always establish a cryptographic session key and negotiate real message signing."
Here is the timeline, per KB5135557:
- Phase 1, November 10, 2026. Windows clients offer NTLM signing on all connections by default. Servers still accept both signed and unsigned clients. Audit events flag clients that do not sign.
- Phase 2, May 2027. Windows servers begin requiring NTLM signing by default. "Clients that do not offer signing will be rejected by secure servers."
Microsoft lists Windows 11 versions 23H2 through 26H2, Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021 and Windows Server 2016 through 2025 as covered. Kerberos sign-ins are not affected, per the KB’s FAQ.
How to find old devices before Phase 2 enforcement
The devices at risk in May 2027 are clients that connect to your Windows servers with NTLM and do not offer signing. In small offices that often means scan-to-folder copiers, older NAS units that pull backups from Windows shares, and old line-of-business apps. Windows devices on current updates will offer signing on their own.
Microsoft’s audit steps in KB5135557:
- Read the NTLM log. Look at Event ID 4023 on servers and 4022 on clients, in the Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational log. Microsoft notes these events are available on Windows Server 2019 and later with NTLM enhanced auditing.
- Check the flags, not the level. Signed and unsigned connections both log at the Warning level. A good connection shows "Session Key Status: Present" with the SIGN bit set in the negotiated flags. The KB includes a PowerShell script that lists clients without it.
- Fix or replace each device. Update firmware, switch the device to Kerberos where it can use it, or plan a replacement. Microsoft offers a client setting, ClientAllowUnsignedNtlm, only "for temporary compatibility."
- Turn on enforcement early. Set the ServerRequireNtlmSign registry value to 1 once your audit shows no unsigned connections. Microsoft says no restart is needed.
If a server you rely on is Windows Server 2016, check our post on Windows Server 2016 end of support. Old NAS units have their own risks too, covered in Synology ransomware and outdated DSM.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-124194?
An Outlook zero-day that Microsoft fixed on November 10, 2026. A crafted message file can make Outlook connect to an attacker’s server and leak the user’s NTLMv2 hash.
Is it being exploited?
Yes. Microsoft marks it “Exploitation Detected,” and CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 10.
Does the Preview Pane trigger it?
No. Microsoft says the Preview Pane is not an attack vector. A user has to open the malicious file.
What is the CISA deadline?
November 24, 2026, for federal civilian agencies. CISA encourages all organizations to prioritize KEV flaws, so it is a sensible target for everyone.
Why is it rated only Moderate?
Microsoft gives it a CVSS score of 6.5 because a user must open the file. Active attacks make it more urgent than the score suggests.
Does blocking port 445 replace the Outlook zero-day patch?
No. It helps on your office network, but remote staff at home are not behind your firewall. Patch Outlook first.
What is NTLM signing Phase 1?
Since November 10, 2026, Windows clients offer NTLM signing by default. Servers still accept unsigned clients, and audit events show which ones do not sign.
When does Microsoft enforce NTLM signing?
In Phase 2, in May 2027, Windows servers begin requiring signing by default. Clients that do not offer it will be rejected.
Will NTLM signing affect Kerberos?
No. Microsoft’s KB5135557 FAQ says Kerberos is not affected by this change.