Security

ScreenConnect Attack Puts Rogue Clients on MSP Customer PCs: What to Ask Your MSP

A cinematic film still of a wooden chessboard at night where several extra dull green pieces have appeared among the black and white pieces, a visual for the ScreenConnect attack that slipped rogue remote access clients onto MSP customer computers

A ScreenConnect attack that began on November 11 used MSPs’ own remote access consoles to install extra, attacker-controlled ScreenConnect clients on the computers they manage. Huntress says it saw at least 288 hosts across 48 organizations hit in the first wave, all within 90 minutes, in its SCKit write-up. A second wave on November 13 hit 205 more hosts across 41 organizations, Huntress added in an update.

ScreenConnect is ConnectWise’s remote support tool. Many managed service providers (MSPs) use it to reach the laptops and servers of the nonprofits and associations they support. In the ScreenConnect attack, ConnectWise says it has found no evidence that its own infrastructure was breached. Its Trust Center advisory points instead to third-party extensions that partners added to their ScreenConnect servers. This is the third MSP tool emergency we have covered in a week. Facts here are as of 11:50 p.m. ET on November 15, 2026.

The short version: if your MSP uses ScreenConnect, ask this week whether it ran any of the extensions ConnectWise named, and whether it has checked your computers for a second ScreenConnect client. Ask whether its technician computers run ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later. If one of your machines looks affected, the MSP should not connect to it through ScreenConnect to clean it.

What happened in the ScreenConnect attack

Huntress, a managed security firm that watches many MSP-managed endpoints, saw the activity start at about 17:47 UTC (12:47 p.m. ET) on November 11. According to Huntress, an operator used the Run Command feature in several cloud-hosted ScreenConnect consoles. That feature sends one command to many computers at once. The commands ran as SYSTEM, the most powerful account on a Windows PC.

Huntress describes what those commands did:

  • Checked for an existing ScreenConnect client.
  • Downloaded an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect installer and installed it silently.
  • Dropped a script that fetched a toolkit Huntress calls SCKit, unique to each machine.
  • Added exclusions to Microsoft Defender and installed a second rogue ScreenConnect client.
  • Created a scheduled task named TrapWatch that runs as SYSTEM. It stops the real ScreenConnect client and puts the attacker’s copy in its place.

SCKit is a package of 16 files, per Huntress. Its code is built to spread. When a technician connects to an infected PC, it tries to jump to the technician’s workstation, steal the console login cookie, and push itself to every computer that technician can reach. Huntress says it has not seen that spread work. "The console-takeover attempt failed in every recovered host log we have checked so far," Huntress wrote.

In the November 13 wave, Huntress saw a rogue client installed as a service named "Windows Update Agent" to look like a normal Windows part. It ran from a folder of the same name under C:\ProgramData.

The extension behind it

Late on November 11, Huntress tied the activity to RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension. RMM+ lets another tool manage ScreenConnect sessions without a technician in the console. Huntress says RMM+ skips ScreenConnect’s user accounts, roles and MFA and checks a shared access key instead. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, if no one had set that key, a blank one was accepted. Huntress says most RMM+ installs it found were legitimate, "usually added for a project and left in place."

That matches what Huntress saw in logs. Commands reached endpoints in several ScreenConnect instances within minutes, with no matching login activity.

ConnectWise’s advisory says a CVE has been assigned to the issue in the extension. It also says the extensions’ presence alone does not mean a partner was compromised.

What ConnectWise says about the ScreenConnect attack

ConnectWise first posted its advisory at 22:45 UTC on November 11 and has updated it three times, most recently at 21:15 UTC on November 13. Here is the timeline from both companies.

When (UTC) Source What it said
Nov 11, 17:47 Huntress First wave starts; 288 hosts in 48 organizations within 90 minutes
Nov 11, 22:45 ConnectWise Five third-party extensions disabled in about 400 partner environments as a precaution
Nov 12, 18:45 ConnectWise No evidence its infrastructure was compromised; technician clients must run 26.6.5 or later
Nov 13, 16:12 Huntress Second wave: 205 hosts in 41 organizations, new attacker server
Nov 13, 21:15 ConnectWise On-premises partners “must immediately disable” the extensions; three more disabled in the cloud

The five extensions ConnectWise named first are Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. Its November 13 update adds three more it disabled in cloud environments and its marketplace as a precaution: ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter. ConnectWise says it cannot disable extensions on servers partners run themselves.

ConnectWise also says ScreenConnect client 26.6.5, released September 8, 2026, blocks SCKit’s attempt to spread from an infected endpoint to a technician. That version fixed CVE-2026-84869, a file-transfer flaw. ConnectWise warns that updating the cloud console does not update technician clients. Each workstation must be checked.

ConnectWise is clear about its limits. It says it has no visibility into activity inside partner environments after initial access. Partners must check their own and their customers’ systems.

How an MSP can check for the ScreenConnect attack

These steps come from Huntress’s and ConnectWise’s guidance on the ScreenConnect attack. They are for the MSP or whoever runs your ScreenConnect server. If that is not you, forward this list.

  1. Review Run Command and Toolbox history. Look for mass commands or tools no one on the team started, since November 11.

  2. Look for new admins and permission changes. ConnectWise lists new administrator accounts, permission changes and unexpected extension installs as warning signs.

  3. Look for a second ScreenConnect client on managed computers. Confirm every client ID belongs to the MSP’s own instance. Huntress lists rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091.

  4. Check for SCKit traces. Huntress lists a scheduled task named TrapWatch, a C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap folder, sckit files in temp folders, and a Run registry value named RelayTrapLiteAlert.

  5. Check Defender exclusions. The kit adds them, so a clean Defender scan may not mean much.

  6. Check extensions and client versions. Confirm the eight named extensions are disabled. Confirm every technician client is on 26.6.5 or later.

  7. Revoke sessions from a clean device. End active ScreenConnect web sessions, reset credentials and enforce MFA. Both companies say to revoke identity-provider sessions too, since the kit targets session cookies.

Do not use ScreenConnect to investigate or clean a computer you think is infected. Huntress says an interactive session can trigger the spread to the technician’s workstation. Use EDR tools or another out-of-band method, and keep the machine isolated until the rogue client and the TrapWatch task are gone.

Huntress adds that isolation alone does not remove the persistence. It says some systems reinfected soon after isolation was lifted. A host should not go back into service until it has been checked for reinfection.

What a nonprofit or association should ask its MSP this week

Most small organizations never log in to ScreenConnect. Their MSP does, every day. Send these questions in one email and ask for a written reply.

  1. Do you use ScreenConnect for us, and is it cloud-hosted or on your own server?

  2. Did you have any of the eight extensions ConnectWise named? If on-premises, ask when they were disabled.

  3. Have you reviewed Run Command and Toolbox history since November 11? Ask what they found.

  4. Did you find any second ScreenConnect client, TrapWatch task or RelayTrap folder on our computers?

  5. Are all your technician clients on ScreenConnect 26.6.5 or later? Ask how they checked.

  6. Did you revoke sessions, reset credentials and confirm MFA on your ScreenConnect accounts?

  7. What EDR or other tool would you use to clean a machine without ScreenConnect?

  8. Which other extensions or integrations can run commands on our computers?

A good MSP will answer these questions about the ScreenConnect attack quickly. If it cannot say whether it ran the named extensions, that is useful to know too.

Why the ScreenConnect attack matters beyond this week

Remote access tools hold the keys to every computer an MSP manages. Last week, N-able took its RMM tool offline over critical flaws, as we covered in N-able takes N-central offline. The same night, a breach at a service desk vendor reached client Microsoft 365 tenants, covered in the MSP Process breach post. This ScreenConnect attack followed a similar path through a trusted add-on.

Huntress says it ran a Rapid Response in September 2026 to similar worm-like activity that spread rogue ScreenConnect clients. The lesson repeats. Old add-ons and integrations stay in place long after the project that needed them ends.

On your side, endpoint protection on every PC still matters, since it may catch what the MSP misses. Our endpoint security basics post covers the core pieces. Our MFA explainer covers why MFA on admin tools is the minimum, even if an extension can bypass it.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the ScreenConnect attack?

Starting November 11, 2026, attackers used MSPs’ ScreenConnect consoles to install rogue ScreenConnect clients and a toolkit called SCKit on managed computers. Huntress counted 288 hosts in 48 organizations in the first wave and 205 hosts in 41 organizations on November 13.

Was ConnectWise itself hacked?

ConnectWise says it has found no evidence that its infrastructure was compromised, or that initial access involved a ScreenConnect vulnerability. Its initial assessment points to abuse of independent third-party extensions. It says it is still validating that.

What is RMM+?

RMM+ is a third-party ScreenConnect extension that lets another tool manage sessions without a technician. Huntress says versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key if none had been set.

Which extensions did ConnectWise disable?

First Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. On November 13 it added ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter in cloud environments.

Does SCKit spread on its own?

Its code is built to spread from an infected PC to a connecting technician and then to other computers. Huntress says it has not seen that spread succeed. ConnectWise says client 26.6.5 and later blocks the technique.

What is TrapWatch?

It is a scheduled task the kit creates. Huntress says it runs as SYSTEM every 10 seconds, stops the real ScreenConnect client and lets the rogue copy take its connection slot.

Our MSP does not use ScreenConnect. Should we do anything?

Ask them to confirm it in writing. Then ask which remote access tools and add-ons can run commands on your computers. The same kind of risk applies to other tools.

Should our staff do anything after the ScreenConnect attack?

Staff should report unexpected remote sessions, pop-ups asking for access, or new remote support programs on their PCs to the MSP. They should not try to remove software themselves.

Digital Matters

Security Desk